KLM Royal Dutch Airlines
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- KLM Royal Dutch Airlines
P.O. Box 7700
1117 ZL Schiphol
- Main hub
- Amsterdam Schiphol Airport
- Business model
- Full Service Carrier
- Domestic | International
- Airline Group
- Part of Air France-KLM S.A.
- Frequent Flyer Programme
- Flying Blue
- Joined Alliance
- Association Membership
- Codeshare Partners
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Established in 1920, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines is the national carrier of the Netherlands. KLM operates an extensive network which includes services within Europe and to Asia, Africa, North America, Central and South America and the Middle East. The carrier also operates freight services, and handles all service operations from its hub at Amsterdam Schiphol Airport. KLM is a founding member of the SkyTeam alliance, and is part of Air France-KLM S.A.
Location of KLM Royal Dutch Airlines main hub (Amsterdam Schiphol Airport)
3,340 total articles
264 total articles
The 747 has been in the spotlight since the Aug-2016 passing of lead engineer Joe Sutter. The iconic aircraft's milestones and fade from service come into focus again with the impending retirement of Cathay Pacific's passenger 747 fleet. A Cathay Pacific 747-400 was the final commercial flight to depart Hong Kong's old airport at Kai Tak, while another Cathay 747 was the first commercial flight to land at the new airport at Chek Lap Kok – with that flight also the first to use a Polar Routing, one which has changed the Asia-North America market for all airlines.
After the 01-Oct-2016 return to Hong Kong of Cathay's final passenger 747 flight, CX543 from Tokyo Haneda, Cathay's last three passenger 747s will be decommissioned from normal service. The global fleet of passenger/combi 747-400s will then decrease to 204, according to CAPA's Fleet Database. The 747-400s in regular, non-charter service will number 175. Six airlines – British Airways, United, KLM, Lufthansa, Qantas and Thai Airways – operate 10 or more 747s, accounting for 65% of what is left of the regular in-service fleet. United will retire its 747 fleet by 2018, while British Airways and Qantas (which operates the slightly newer 747-400ER) look likely to be some of the last 747 (non-8i) operators, with service stretching into 2020.
The last of Europe's leading listed airline groups reported 1H2016 results on 19-Sep-2016. This now allows analysis of the aggregate trends for the 15 largest European airline groups listed on the stock market that publicly report financial results for the first six months of the calendar year. These groups account for 53% of ASKs flown to/from/within Europe by all airlines and 71% of ASKs flown by European airlines (week of 19-Sep-2016, source: OAG).
Collectively, these 15 groups enjoyed an improvement in operating margin in 1H2016 versus 1H2015. This was achieved in spite of heavy downward pressure on unit revenue – thanks largely to lower fuel prices, which allowed them to cut unit costs more rapidly. However, there was a wider range of levels of profitability in the individual results compared with last year.
Moreover, in margin terms, there was a trend towards the strong getting stronger and the weak getting weaker. Further, there has been a number of profit warnings in the sector – particularly since the UK's Brexit referendum. This may mean that further improvements in the aggregate results of Europe's listed airline sector will be harder to achieve in 2017.
The Brexit referendum produced a vote for the United Kingdom to leave the EU, although this process has not yet been formally invoked. In the scope of aviation, one outcome is the potential loss of the UK in shaping air service agreement negotiations. The UK has been a liberalising voice, one that often counterbalanced more protectionist views from France and Germany. The UK is often able to galvanise the smaller EU states too.
The EU now has mandates to negotiate open skies with states, including the UAE, Qatar, Turkey and the ASEAN bloc. The UAE and Qatar, home to the three Gulf network airlines, are expected to produce the most contentious negotiations. France and Germany will surely takes cues from Air France and Lufthansa to impede Gulf growth. In this light there are questions about whether the talks are genuinely motivated, or merely designed to draw out the discussion and thereby not produce any additional traffic rights while under negotiation.
What Air France and Lufthansa need is a real, lasting solution, rather than persevering Canute-like with stonewalling. Although a partnership seems logical, they may have waited too long. The Gulf airlines have found that they can succeed on their own.
Part 1 of CAPA's Brexit follow-up report assessed the ASK exposure of UK and non-UK airlines to market segments where existing traffic rights could potentially change once the UK finally leaves the European Union. This second part reviews recent comments by leading European-listed airlines on how they see the impact of Brexit, both in the short term and in the longer term. Most of them acknowledge that there are considerable uncertainties, while simultaneously insisting that they will not be significantly affected in the long run.
There have been two initial impacts on airlines. First, Brexit has added to economic uncertainty, thereby muting demand and lowering yields. The magnitude and duration of this impact is unpredictable. Secondly, the consequent weakening of the GBP has made outbound international travel from the UK more expensive and less appealing, and lowered the value of GBP revenue earned by airlines.
The longer term impact will depend on whatever new traffic rights regime is negotiated between the UK and the EU. As a number of the airlines have acknowledged, this remains unknown and is, indeed, unknowable until the UK formally triggers its exit from the EU and then completes its two-year exit negotiations.
CAPA's previous analytical coverage of the UK referendum vote to leave the European Union flagged several questions surrounding UK airlines' future access to the European single aviation market. Traffic rights post-Brexit will depend heavily on the wider relationship between the UK and the EU and its markets. In turn, this may depend on how far the UK is prepared to go in embracing the EU's four key freedoms: the movement of capital, goods, services and people.
The UK has not yet triggered its formal two-year exit negotiation period and all aspects of its future relationship with the EU remain unknown. However, politicians in the UK are very reluctant to accept the continued freedom of movement of people, so existing airline market access is likely to be compromised in some way.
Rather than speculate on how negotiations might proceed, this report identifies the main market segments that could be affected by changes to the traffic rights regime, and evaluates the ASK exposure of airlines from the UK and from countries in Europe's single aviation market to these segments. A further report will review recent comments by Europe's leading listed airlines on how they see the impact of Brexit.
As airlines have embraced dual brand strategies to reach full service and low cost growth aviation IT has responded, as seen with Amadeus' acquisition of Navitaire, which mostly but not exclusively powered the passenger service systems (PSS) of LCCs. In the first six months since the deal closed Navitaire has added 230m passengers boarded, to Amadeus Altea's 393m. Navitaire passengers account for 37% of Amadeus' total.
Having significantly grown its market share, and with past LCC product forays not having worked out, Amadeus receives a new business stream. Some Navitaire customers (Ryanair, AirAsia, IndiGo) are larger than Altea customers and have high growth ahead of them. A second benefit is the Navitaire acquisition supporting Altea customers. By owning both products Amadeus can improve connectivity between Altea and Navitaire airlines. Most of Altea's large customers – Lufthansa, IAG, AF-KLM, Qantas and JAL – have an LCC operating Navitaire software. Of Navitaire's passengers – 35% are on airlines that are LCC units of full service airlines. Other airlines may be holding out on pursuing partnerships and connectivity until there is a cheaper, simpler and streamlined way.
It may seem that the Amadeus-Navitaire marriage is about full service and low cost segments, but its greatest strength is the role it will have in the hybrid segment. Hybridity is growing, and Amadeus-Navitaire could galvanise further expansion.